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Abstract: In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learn
from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behavior of executives
in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms.
Proposals in four specific areas are discussed: manager compensation, the division of power
within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas
of the corporation. (73 words)
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1The corporate world has recently experienced a sobering up. The stock market has crashed, and
the corporate sector has been plagued by huge scandals relating to excessive manager
compensation and fraudulent bookkeeping. There is a widespread concern that corporate
governance mechanisms have failed to prevent these scandals. As a consequence, improvements
in corporate governance are sought after, like those embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and
regulators are considering further changes to improve the corporate governance system.
The weaknesses and failures of actual corporate governance practice suggest that it might be
useful to approach the issue from a new perspective. In this paper, it is argued that fresh insights
for corporate governance can be gained from the way democratic government and public
administration are organized. Corporate governance can learn from public governance, in the
sense that institutions devised to control and regulate the behavior of actors in the public sphere
can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. The public governance
perspective offers a distinct set of theoretical ideas on corporate governance, it proposes
governance mechanisms that differ substantially from what is currently practiced, and it advances
research questions that diverge from those pursued by accepted theories.
The notion that corporate governance can learn from public governance does not mean, of course,
that public governance has produced ideal results – far from it. It is well-known that democratic
politics and public administration are subject to many inefficiencies and scandals, and that
distortions due to rent seeking activities are prevalent. These aspects have been analyzed in depth
by Public Choice Theory or Modern Political Economy.
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 But this does not exclude that some
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 For introductions see e.g. Frey (1978), Persson & Tabellini (2002) and Mueller (1997, 2003). The shortcomings of
public bureaucracy are discussed in Niskanen (1971) or Wintrobe (1997), and rent seeking in Tullock, Tollison &
Rowley (1988) and Tollison & Congleton (1995).
2institutions of public governance may be useful for corporate governance. Neither does this
exclude that public governance can learn from corporate governance, but this direction of
learning has been extensively discussed in the past and has resulted, for example, in the
introduction of New Public Management in at least some parts of public administration (e.g.,
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000).
The approach followed here stands in the tradition of Constitutional Political Economy, the
economic analysis of political institutions, and thus strongly resorts to theories political
economists have developed on the workings of political processes (for surveys, see Frey, 1983;
Mueller, 1996; Cooter 2000). In proposing the public governance approach, our primary goal is
not to re-consider existing corporate governance theories, such as Agency Theory, Stewardship
Theory, or Resource Dependence Theory (for reviews, see e.g. Hung, 1998; Daily, Dalton &
Cannella, 2003). Rather, our aim in this paper is to break new ground, by introducing new,
forgotten or neglected aspects. As a consequence, however, the ideas for organizational design
differ substantially from what is suggested by accepted theories.
We propose that corporate governance can learn from four cornerstones of public governance.
First, we argue that corporate governance can gain from realigning managers’ compensation with
the practice prevalent in the public sector, namely fixed compensation not dependent on pay-for-
performance. Second, we consider the advantages of relying on the basic democratic idea of
division of power in corporate governance. Third, we discuss how rules of succession prevalent
in the political sphere can be applied in order to devise better governance rules. And fourth, we
propose that corporate governance can be improved by relying on institutionalized competition in
core areas of the firm. In addition to the arguments advanced, we outline the differences of the
3public governance approach to other corporate governance theories with respect to their
theoretical ideas and research emphases.
RETURN TO FIXED COMPENSATION
Public governance teaches us that politicians, public officials and judges receive fixed salaries,
because those persons who set the regulations should not be given an incentive to manipulate the
corresponding criteria in their own favor. In management, the exact opposite has taken place over
the 1990’s: the top executives were given the opportunity and the incentives to manipulate the
criteria by which they were evaluated and compensated.
The public sector approach to pay avoids fundamental problems connected with pay-for-
performance, some of them well-known in the business economics and economics literatures.
Performance is rarely easily defined in the public sector, and in many cases, only some aspects of
performance are measurable, leading to the multi-tasking problem that only those tasks are
performed that are subject to performance pay (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Tirole, 1994;
Prendergast, 1999). In a politico-economic view, however, there are some more fundamental
issues involved. Political economists have traditionally focused on politicians’ possibilities and
incentives to manipulate the criteria by which they are evaluated (for early applications, see e.g.
Frey & Schneider, 1978a,b; Frey, 1983). In this view, pay-for-performance for politicians and
bureaucrats does not make sense, because they are the ones who decide over the very standards
they are compensated by.
The public governance view suggests that corporate governance can gain from taking this insight
seriously and in consequence return to more fixed forms of top-management compensation. The
4system of pay-for-performance that has built up during the 1990’s has induced managers to
devote time and effort to influencing their variable income. Managers rationally engage in
unproductive rent seeking activities in order to manipulate the performance standards and
therewith their income. While they can seek higher income by increased effort, they have often
found it easier and less demanding to influence the measuring rod, even by distorting and
falsifying the figures. The public governance perspective finds considerable support in the
empirical literature. Several empirical studies have shown that there is a strong relationship
between the extent of variable, stock-based executive compensation and the incidence of
corporate fraud. It has been documented, for example, that CEOs of firms that restated their
earnings in 2000 and 2001 held an average value of “in-the-money” stock options of $30.1
million, while CEOs in a matched sample of firms without earnings restatements only held $2.3
million (Efendi, Srivastava & Swanson, 2004). A study of accounting frauds over the period
1996-2003 indicated that the proportion of stock-based compensation to total compensation for
the five top executives was considerably higher in fraud firms than in comparable non-fraud
firms, on average 56 percent vs. 41 percent (Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 2003). Similarly, it
has been shown that managers involved in accounting frauds over the period 1992-2001 had a 69
percent higher pay-for-performance sensitivity than managers not involved in frauds, a result of
their much higher stock and stock option compensation, approximately $4.4 million more at the
median (Johnson, Ryan & Tian, 2003). Performance pay is thus found to give executives strong
incentives to engage in manipulation activities.
It is noteworthy that dominant approaches in corporate governance theory, such as Agency
Theory, have to a large extent failed to see this rational reaction by managers subjected to pay-
for-performance, an observation that is now largely acknowledged by proponents of Agency
Theory (Becht, Bolton & Röell, 2002: 47; Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004: 98). The corporate
frauds that have occurred, however, have caused enormous damage, not only for the companies,
5investors and employees involved, but arguably also for the market economy as a whole. The
U.S. General Accounting Office estimates, for example, that accounting restatements over the
period 1997-2001 have cost investors about $100 billion in market capitalization losses, and have
seriously damaged public confidence in the business community and capital markets (GAO,
2002: 26-41).
A system of fixed compensation, as favored in public governance, differs substantially from pay-
for-performance, in that it induces actors to concentrate on work content rather than on
compensation. Fixed incomes have the important advantage of serving as “redistribution
constraints” (Hansmann, 1996; Osterloh & Rota, 2003; Frey & Osterloh 2005). They free
individuals from fighting over earnings and lead them to devote their effort to productive
activities. As a result, rent seeking and negative sum games are reduced, and incentives to
manipulate the standards of compensation are diminished.
There are several obvious counterarguments against purely fixed compensations for top
managers. Most importantly, firms act in a different environment than governments and public
bureaucracies, and entrepreneurial incentives are supposed to be more important on the market
than in democratic decision-making. This distinction indeed has always been part of Modern
Political Economy (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953). The public governance approach should therefore
not be taken to mean that managers should be badly paid, or that they should not be given any
incentives at all. Public sector experience clearly shows that wages that are too low can lead to
problems of their own, like an increased willingness of public officials to accept corruption
payments (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; DiTella & Schargrodsky, 2003). The public governance
perspective suggests, however, that the current focus on performance pay in the private sector is
6overdrawn, and that corporate governance practice can benefit from a return to a predominantly
public sector style fixed compensation.
A related counterargument against fixed compensation is that managers only work in
shareholders’ interests when they are given the appropriate pay-for-performance incentives. The
existing evidence on management pay, however, suggests that predominantly fixed
compensations can be a suitable way to remunerate top managers. Decades of research have
shown that there is only a weakly positive relationship between management compensation and
firm performance (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Murphy, 1999: 2555-6). Research
moreover suggests that the supposed positive effects of performance pay might already be
achieved with a relatively low incentive intensity (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). Thus, a
predominantly fixed compensation with a moderate amount of performance incentives (e.g. a 20
percent share of total compensation in restricted stock) may already combine the virtues of public
sector style and performance-oriented compensation. This is to contrast with the current situation,
where in 2003, top managers in the United States received 67 percent of their total compensation
in a stock-based form, about half of it in stock options (New York Times, 2004). The public
governance perspective thus advocates a fundamental change in manager compensation. The
proposed effect is a significant reduction of managers’ incentives to engage in deceitful and
illegal behavior, while a certain level of entrepreneurial incentives for executives is maintained in
order to ensure performance.
DIVISION OF POWER
An important function of corporate governance is to control and discipline management (Daily et
al., 2003). The same goal is shared by democratic government, where disciplining public agents
7is a central task. In both areas of governance, a core problem is that persons occupying leading
positions tend to accumulate uncontrolled discretion. For centuries, democracies have developed
various effective institutions to restrict this accumulation of power. Of paramount importance is
the idea of division of power. Democratic states distribute the right to act among the three
classical decision-making bodies: the executive, legislative and jurisdictive branches. Democratic
constitutions actively promote the principle of checks and balances. This does not prevent one
branch from dominating for a period of time, but it ensures that the other branches can reassert
themselves in due time. This principle is clearly visible in, among others, the American
constitution.
A close analogy has often been seen between private corporations and the public sector. The
CEO corresponds to the head of government, the company board to the members of the cabinet,
and shareholders are corporate citizens convening in a town council meeting. The political
structures of the private and the public sector, however, also differ in fundamental respects. Most
importantly, the principle of division of power is applied much less strictly in corporate
governance than in public governance (Kesner & Dalton, 1986). In many countries, in particular
in the USA, France and Switzerland, it is common practice that the CEO of the firm is at the
same time the chairman of the board and therewith of the shareholder meeting. This blurs the
division between the top agents (CEOs) and the principals (shareholders). In the same vein, not
much attention has been paid until recently to a clear separation of the control over core aspects
of the firm, like the independence of compensation and audit committees.
Division of power is an area where corporate governance can gain insights from public
governance, and indeed it already has to some extent. In public governance, there is an
independent institution controlling the executives, the “court of accounts”, “Rechnungshöfe”, or,
8in the United States, the “General Accounting Office”. In many countries, the competencies of
courts of accounts are quite restricted, so that in Germany, for instance, the “Rechnungshöfe”
may only inform the parliament and the public about the way the executive performs his or her
task, but may not interfere (Frey, 1994). These courts of accounts derive their independence from
being part of the jurisdictive branch. In Switzerland, in contrast, an interesting form of
“Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen” exists that derives its independence from being directly
elected by the citizens. Empirical evidence shows that such directly elected courts of accounts
have a considerable impact on the quality of government (Schelker & Eichenberger, 2003, 2004).
It seems that they successfully restrain local governments from abusing their power, and induce
them to act more strongly in the citizens’ interests.
The corporate sector has often not clearly separated the executive and external auditing functions,
at least until recently. In many cases, CEOs determined the auditing firms that were supposed to
control them. At the same time, the auditing firms were, and still are, paid for advising jobs for
the CEO and general management (Economist, 2004). As a result of the scandals produced by
this system, there are now government-imposed rules in many countries, more clearly separating
the executive from the auditing branch. In the US, for example, it is now required that all
members of a company’s audit committee are independent directors, and that the audit
committee, rather than management, is directly responsible for the appointment, compensation,
retention and oversight of the work of the auditors (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2003a). Similar standards now also apply to the compensation
committees (NYSE, 2003). This is an area where corporate governance has co-opted institutions
applied in public governance, but only after having incurred huge costs.
9The public governance perspective suggests, however, that more could be learned from the public
sector. The independence of the auditing process could be further improved by relying on the
democratic mechanism of direct elections for (a) the members of the audit committee and (b) the
auditing firm by the shareholders. This reflects the basic democratic idea that the independence of
a committee ultimately has to be based on the fact that it has been freely chosen by the people
who have an interest in it being independent – in this case the shareholders. The reasoning can
also be applied to compensation committees and the choice of the auditing firm, whose
independence would be strengthened by competitive elections. Evidence from the public sector
shows that the direct election of independent bodies leads them to take the citizens’ interest better
into account than when they are just appointed (and are more likely to be “captured” by those
they are supposed to control). It has been documented, for example, that public regulators act in a
more consumer-friendly way when they are directly elected by the citizens rather than appointed
by politicians (Besley & Coate, 2003). Similarly, elected courts of accounts that are independent
of local governments have been shown to improve public policies in Swiss municipalities
(Schelker & Eichenberger, 2003, 2004).
The most important area where corporate governance violates the principle of division of power
is CEO duality, i.e. when the CEO of the firm is at the same time the chairman of the board.
From a public governance perspective, this seriously blurs the distinction between the
management and the board who is supposed to control it. In contrast to this view, however, the
existing empirical evidence shows that CEO duality does neither lead to catastrophic nor to
beneficial consequences. While researchers have found a weakly positive relationship between
CEO duality and the incidence of corporate fraud (Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 2004; Uzun,
Szewczyk & Varma, 2004; Beasley, 1996; Dechow, Sloan & Sweene, 1996), a large number of
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empirical studies documents that firm performance is essentially unaffected by the combination
of the chairman and CEO positions (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998). According to this
evidence, one might conclude that the public governance approach overstates the importance of
division of power in firms.
From a public governance perspective, however, the existing empirical literature has taken a
relatively simplistic view on CEO duality. Independence of the two positions is simply assumed
as given if they are held by different persons (Dalton et al., 1998: 271-272; Daily & Dalton,
1997). A closer look at split chairman / CEO roles in S&P 500 firms, however, reveals a
strikingly different nature of these arrangements. In 2004, out of 112 chairman positions held
separately (i.e. not by the current CEO), 63.4 percent (71) were occupied by the former CEO of
the firm, 14.3 percent (16) by a former or current executive of the firm, and only 22.3 percent
(25) by a truly independent person (The Corporate Library, 2004; see also Vancil, 1987). This
evidence seriously questions whether split chairman / CEO positions can in practice be
considered as an effective control device, given, among other factors, the important role that
outgoing CEOs play in the determination of their successors (Shen & Cannella, 2002) and the
fact that current executives are supposed to monitor their own bosses. The public governance
perspective offers in this instance novel insights with respect to scientific inferences as well as
corporate governance practice.
With regard to scientific inferences, the public governance view suggests a novel theoretical
relationship that future empirical work can test: the beneficial effects of division of power on
organizational outcomes are expected to be the larger, the greater is the actual independence of
the chairman vis-à-vis the CEO. It can be hypothesized that actual independence increases in the
relational distance between the two persons: it is highest for truly independent chairmen (who are
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not a former CEO nor a current or former executive), followed by former CEOs or executives,
current executives, and at the low end, CEO/chairman positions held by the same person.
Empirical research might also test several interesting interaction effects that can be related to the
diverse nature of split CEO/chairman positions. For example, one might consider differential
implications of having a former CEO as chairman and an outsider/insider CEO as his successor,
where independence is supposed to be higher in the “former CEO/outsider CEO” case (Shen &
Cannella, 2002), or interaction effects with the issue of split CEO/COO appointments can be
explored (Hambrick & Canella, 2004). In any event, the public governance perspective suggests a
more thorough view on the actual division of power in top positions of corporations.
The public governance approach also has implications for corporate governance practice. Given
that its strong emphasis on division of power is correct, it follows that the positions of chairman
and CEO should be separated, and the former filled with truly independent persons. Preferably,
this could be done in competitive elections, where the chairman is directly elected by the
shareholders. In a related manner, the public governance approach may offer a new rationale for
why shareholder activism in the U.S. has generally aimed at a separation of the chairman/CEO
functions, despite the apparently non-existing effects on company performance (Daily et al.,
2003: 373), and for why reform proposals in countries like Germany or the United Kingdom
require or at least recommend a separation of the CEO and the chairman of the board positions
(Hopt & Leyens 2004).
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RULES OF SUCCESSION
Democratic constitutions constrain their agents not only by division of power, but also by
extensive rules of law that regulate the succession and the rotation in leading positions. Three
rules are of particular importance:
(a) Restricted terms of office. The members of parliament and directly elected presidents are
(normally) elected for four years. At the end of this period, their term in office ends
automatically; no further decision is needed.
(b) Reelection restrictions. Many constitutions know the provision that a president may only be
reelected for one additional term. This is a very strong constraint: it can safely be assumed that
many, if not most, presidents would have been reelected for more terms. In some Swiss cantons
(e.g. in Basel-Stadt), popular initiatives have successfully restrained the number of terms in office
of the members of parliament. The German Green party introduced similar provisions, but they
have since been mitigated or totally abolished.
(c) Rotation of positions. Some parties (again the German Green party is an example) instituted
an automatic change of positions between the leaders of the party and the party’s representatives
in parliament or government. The Swiss government rotates the position of the president of the
Federal Council every year among the seven council members.
The basic idea behind these rules is that they are able to effectively restrict the power of public
agents. Moreover, they also open positions to newcomers, and therefore to fresh ideas. Of the
three rules, the one relating to restricted terms in office is the most commonly used in public
governance, being part of essentially all existing democratic constitutions. But also the
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requirement of reelection restrictions is common, most notably in the form of the two-term limit
for the US president.
Corporate governance also knows either self-imposed or government-imposed rules, but they are
much less far reaching than those used in public governance, mainly because the market is
supposed to control firms. In principle, the terms of office of agents in private corporations are
limited, even more so than in public governance. In the United States, for example, the members
of the board have to stand for reelection every year at the shareholder meeting (Bebchuk, Coates
& Subramanian, 2002). But in practice, this is just a formal provision of no real consequence.
Recent empirical evidence indicates that board seats have almost never been contested in the U.S.
from 1996 to 2002, which means that automatic reelection is the rule (Bebchuk, 2003).
2
 For top
managers, there are no formal term limits, as they are subject to a standard employment contract
and can be dismissed at any time by the board.
Corporate governance can learn from public governance by considering formal term limits for top
agents. The main advantage of term limits is that they entail an automatic end of office, where no
further discussion and decision is needed, and that they bring about a binding reelection
constraint. In the case of board members, such a regime would basically reinstall the idea lying
behind existing laws. In practice, however, it would certainly lead to major changes, like the
emergence of genuine competitive elections for board positions. Term limits can also be
envisaged for the top executive function of the CEO, for example in the form of a two or four
                                                 
2
 Bebchuk (2003) gives several reasons why board seats are almost never contested. Although shareholders can in
principle nominate director candidates, they can do so only by soliciting separate corporate proxies. The costs and
difficulties of running such proxy contests are high, and their attractiveness is further hampered by a public good
problem (the soliciting shareholders bear all the costs, but only reap a fraction of the benefits). Moreover, many
boards in the US are “staggered”, i.e. only a fraction of board members stands for reelection every year.
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year term. Naturally, such term limits for CEOs would entail advantages as well as some
disadvantages.
With respect to disadvantages, the discussion can be informed by the existing public governance
literature. It is a well-established fact in political economics that four-year term limits for
politicians lead to certain dysfunctionalities. In particular, politicians tend to create “political
business cycles” around election dates. In order to create a favorable state of the economy (which
is positively evaluated by voters), they influence economic variables like unemployment and
inflation, with real costs accruing after the election, or they target public projects in order to win
the support of important interest groups (for a survey, see Frey & Benz, 2003). The same
reasoning can be applied to the corporate sector: four-year term limits would lead CEOs to
manipulate company fundamentals such that the firm can be presented in a favorable light at
reelection time.
The dysfunctional effects of term limits, however, have to be evaluated in a comparative
perspective. The current pay-for-performance systems arguably give CEOs incentives to act in an
even more short-sighted way, as the recent corporate scandals have made clear. Seen from this
perspective, well-defined term lengths of four years have several advantages. First, term limits
always contain an element of term “guarantee” – they reinstall an incentive to develop a long-
term view on business, as CEOs are basically granted a four-year period to achieve their goals. If
CEOs perform well, they can be confident to be reelected for a second or subsequent terms, based
on a long-term assessment of their performance. Second, the increased job security leads top
managers to invest more in firm-specific human capital, which cannot be sold to other firms and
thus benefits shareholders (Harris, 1990). And third, term-limits create strong incentives for the
persons electing a CEO to carefully choose a top manager.
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Term-limits thus need not be an alien element in the corporate world. They have a public sector
element, by freeing CEOs from excessive short-term pressures, but at the same time they
introduce a control device currently completely absent form the corporate sector. Binding
reelection constraints can meaningfully complement the control that CEOs face from the product
and financial markets. Moreover, they can (but need not necessarily be) combined with the
requirement of a maximum number of possible reelections. Well-known private firms such as
McKinsey, a consulting partnership, enforce term limits of three years for their managing director
and combine them with a reelection restriction of a maximum of three terms (New York Times,
2003). In contrast, while all political constitutions know term limits of typically four years,
reelection restrictions are rather the exception than the rule (they often exist for heads of state like
the U.S. president, but are less common for members of parliament like the U.S. Senate or
Congress).
INSTITUTIONALIZED COMPETITION
The probably most important area where corporate governance can learn from public governance
is from the latter’s strong emphasis on institutionalized competition. Democratic governance can
be understood to be the competition by parties for votes (Schumpeter, 1942; Downs, 1957). This
competition is closely regulated, but it is fundamentally an open competition. There are three
main features:
(a) Voting rights. Only citizens may participate, and each citizen has one vote. Elections are
individually oriented as the voters can determine which persons will sit in parliament. In some
16
cases (especially at the local and provincial level), the voters are able to also choose the persons
in the executive branch.
(b) Competitive process. Elections must be open and the citizens must have a choice between
several different options, i.e. parties and persons.
(c) Voting rules. Various mechanisms for aggregating votes are used, the best known being “first
past the post” leading to strong majorities, but tending to exclude minorities (the system used in
the United States and United Kingdom), and the proportional system (used in most European
countries). The latter sometimes guarantees seats for minorities, or excludes parties with less than
a certain percentage of votes (e.g. 5% in Germany).
There are several similarities between the voting and representation processes used in the public
sector and in stock companies. In both spheres there is a collective action problem related to
dispersed “ownership”. Corporations use elections by shareholders to determine the members of
the board, and the board then elects the top management and the external auditing firm. But there
is a fundamental difference in the election process, as we know it, that distinguishes the corporate
sector from the public sphere: in most corporations, there is generally no choice between various
alternatives. As a matter of course, the shareholders are offered one person to be elected for one
position on the board, and only one external auditing firm can be chosen, and the CEO cannot be
chosen at all.
We suggest that corporate governance can learn from public governance with respect to the
following three aspects: voting rights, competitive election processes, and voting rules.
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Voting Rights
In principle, each share has one vote. However, this principle is often violated by privileged
shares or by non-voting shares. Such devices are often used to prevent unfriendly takeovers
(Seligman, 1986; Grossman & Hart, 1988), and they are used in many countries (Economist,
2005). Their abolishment would strengthen corporate control and secure truly “democratic”
shareholder representation.
Voting rights may in principle also be given to non-shareholder groups, like the employees. A
regime of “co-determination” can be seen as a formal recognition of “corporate citizenship” or,
more broadly, of “organizational citizenship”. The German experience with co-determination
shows that giving employees representation rights does in general neither hurt nor improve firm
performance (Addison, Schnabel & Wagner, 2004). However, it has been stressed in the literature
that the beneficial effects of employee participation are likely to be restricted to firms with much
firm specific human capital (Furubotn, 1988; Roberts & Van den Steen, 2000; Osterloh & Frey,
2005). To the extent that employees’ firm specific human capital becomes more important in the
“knowledge economy”, corporations may develop an increasing interest in the experience many
European countries have made with co-determination.
Competitive Process
Democracy is not well developed within corporations. The essential element of competition,
namely that the voters can choose between relevant alternatives, hardly exists. For instance, for a
truly democratic process, the persons with voting rights in the firm must have the option to
choose between various persons willing to serve as directors. Similarly, they must be able to
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choose between several competing firms offering external auditing. In both cases, the competitors
must be willing to clearly state their interests and program, and must be able to convince the
corporate voters that they are capable of fulfilling the required tasks. It is difficult to see why
such a competitive process exists in the political sphere, but is often taken to be impossible
within corporations. Paradoxically, the way in which capitalist corporations today select their
most important representatives reminds of former communist, undemocratic regimes: there is one
option to choose from, and it gets chosen with a huge majority.
Corporate governance can learn from public governance by rediscovering the importance and the
power of institutionalized competition. Competitive elections seem obvious at the very least for
positions on the board. Board members are the representatives of shareholders, and it is hardly
conceivable why shareholders should not have the possibility to exercise their right of free choice
(see also Bebchuk, 2003, 2004). It is a simple but powerful public governance point that good
representation can only be secured if voters have the opportunity to freely choose their
representatives. This insight, however, seems to have become completely forgotten in corporate
governance.
Competitive elections may not only apply to board members, but can be further extended to core
areas of the firm. For example, a strengthening of corporate governance can be expected if
shareholders are given the right to determine the board members that specifically sit on the
auditing and the compensation committees, and to elect between different auditing firms. Such
elections would greatly improve the independence of the respective actors. It vests them with a
unique, institutionally based legitimacy to take an independent stance. At the same time, it
secures their accountability to shareholders in important corporate matters.
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To see the potential of competitive elections for corporations, one may even go a step further.
Instead of the board members being faced with a choice of top managers chosen by the former
CEO and possibly a small group of directors aided by headhunters, the selection of a new CEO
could be made in an open competition. Even more extreme, the whole management group may be
opened to competition by individuals or firms prepared to fill certain positions like the CEO. The
electoral competition then serves to select the most efficient group (it may be the former
managers), i.e. the group the corporate voters believe to be the most capable relative to the
compensation demanded. Naturally, such a far-reaching proposal raises diverse issues, like the
problem of a reduced confidentially in the application process, but this should not distract from
the potential value the idea has for corporations.
A main counterargument against competitive elections in corporations, in particular for board
positions, is that outside directors would be amateurs relative to the managers they are supposed
to control. As a consequence of this strongly asymmetric state of information, corporate
governance could actually suffer from introducing institutionalized competition. It should be
stressed, however, that competitive elections do not automatically mean that a larger share of
outside directors is elected. Essentially, the proposal only states that shareholders should be given
the possibility to choose among alternatives. It does not prescribe what kind of directors
shareholders ought to elect. If the current board is perceived to perform well, it can be expected
to prevail in a competitive election, whether it consists of inside or outside directors. What is
important is the credible threat of non-election that institutionalized competition entails.
Although there is hardly any experience with competitive elections in public corporations, some
limited related evidence exists in other organizational contexts. It has been empirically
documented, for example, that electoral competition in unions leads in general to a better
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functioning of these bodies (Lipset, Trow & Coleman, 1956; Donaldson & Warner, 1974; Fiorito,
Jarley & Delaney, 1995). In the future, the presumed effects of competitive elections in
corporations might be empirically investigated if a proposal by the SEC is introduced, requesting
that shareholders should have the right to nominate two directors of their choice in the company’s
proxy material (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003b). Although this proposal is much
less far reaching than what is advanced here, it might serve as a first empirical test of the
consequences that electoral competition has for the functioning of firms.
Voting Rules
Public governance tends to be rather conservative. It is difficult to extend the area of democratic
participation or to introduce new voting rules. The major reason is that the established politicians,
parties and interest groups fear to lose from such changes. The corporate sector, being more
dynamic than the public sector, should find it easier to consider new voting mechanisms for
shareholder votes or for decision taken by the board. Examples are voting by veto (Mueller,
1978) or storable votes (Casella, 2002), but there are many others. Firms can choose the
respective innovative voting rules where they are most appropriate, while sticking to simple
majority, qualified majority or unanimity elsewhere.
In sum, institutional devices characteristic for public governance, like broad representation
practices, competitive elections and innovative voting rules, can serve as a pool of ideas and
novel approaches to improve corporate governance. Most notably, corporations can gain from
rediscovering the power of institutionalized competition in determining their most important
representatives.
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DIFFERENCES TO OTHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES
The public governance approach differs in its ideas and research implications from other
corporate governance theories. This applies, first, to Agency Theory, which is without doubt the
dominant approach used in corporate governance research (Daily et al., 2003: 371). Agency
Theory is essentially a control-based theory, arguing that corporate governance mechanisms
ought to be designed such that managerial self-interest is contained and disciplined (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). The public governance approach is similar to Agency Theory in that it stresses
the need to find ways to control self-interested behavior by managers. With respect to concrete
governance mechanisms, however, the theoretical views and research implications differ
substantially.
The distinctive feature of the public governance perspective may be summarized in one
fundamental question. It asks: “who has the actual rights to decide over what?” This is a question
that Agency Theory has taken rather lightly, but is at the center of public governance analysis.
For example, with respect to executive compensation, we have argued that Agency Theory has
overlooked the strong incentives that pay-for-performance plans have created for managers to
engage in deceitful and illegal activities (Becht et al., 2002: 47; Jensen et al., 2004: 98). The
public governance view, in contrast, has traditionally focused on the possibilities and incentives
of those in power positions to manipulate the standards by which they are evaluated. With respect
to division of power, we have shown that analyses based on Agency Theory have taken a
relatively simplistic view on the question of CEO duality, simply assuming independence of
chairman and CEO positions when they are held by two different persons, whereas the public
governance view suggests a much closer look at the actual incentives of presumably independent
chairmen to take truly independent decisions. Lastly, issues of institutionalized competition
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within corporations, like competitive elections for positions on the board, have hardly received
attention in Agency Theory, while the public governance view stresses that voting rights can only
deploy their controlling power if shareholders actually have different alternatives and options to
choose from.
Similar points can be made with respect to Stewardship Theory, an important alternative theory
to Agency Theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). Stewardship Theory argues that
managers are not so much motivated by self-interest, but are often willing to voluntarily act in the
organizations’ interest. The theoretical differences to the public governance approach are in this
instance certainly more pronounced, because the public governance perspective to a large extent
shares the view that managers have to be controlled and disciplined by appropriate governance
mechanisms. A case in point is again CEO duality, where Stewardship Theory points to potential
benefits of combined CEO/chairman positions (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), whereas the public
governance approach emphasizes the need to have truly independent chairmen, and advocates to
more carefully study the consequences of existing split CEO/chairman roles. The public
governance perspective, however, also contains elements similar to Stewardship Theory, by
acknowledging that institutions can instill intrinsically motivated behavior in individuals (for the
political sphere, see Frey, 1997). We have argued, for example, that competitive elections for
board positions vests individuals with a unique, institutionally based legitimacy that can lead to
higher pro-organizational behavior than under the present rule of quasi-appointment. In the same
vein, the proposal of term limits for CEOs contains a stewardship element, arguing that it leads
CEOs to take on a more pro-organizational, long-term view of business.
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CONCLUSIONS
Corporate governance can learn from public governance in the areas of manager compensation,
the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized
competition in core areas of governance. The public governance view offers a novel view on the
topical issue of corporate governance, it has implications for empirical research on how different
governance mechanisms affect organizational outcomes, and, most importantly, it offers a
distinct set of ideas for how corporate governance can be improved in practice. We hope that the
new direction of learning proposed proves to be fruitful, by advancing our understanding of how
corporations are governed, and by affecting the actual practice of corporate governance. The
arguments have been mainly developed with respect to the classical private corporation, but to an
even larger extent, they could be applied to not-for-profit firms and firms with a varying degree
of governmental influence, which may substantially benefit from institutions derived from public
governance.
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